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Abstract
It is one thing to assert that conventional market analysis is critically useful in understanding criminal
enterprise. It is more challenging to suggest that corrupt and compromised legal regulation interacts with
other critical market variables to maximise market advantage for crime business in a similar manner to
legitimate regulatory forces in their protection and enhancement of legitimate business enterprise. The
central argument of this paper is that crime business mirrors other business forms when considered in
terms of critical market variables, and that in particular regulatory forces when inverted from their original
purposes can inﬂuence market conditions in the same ways desired from the legitimate regulatory form.
The main research direction deriving from the analysis of regulatory inﬂuences over speciﬁc criminal
enterprises is how do certain critical market forces essentially facilitate criminal enterprise as a market
phenomenon. This paper suggests how through comparatively analysing nominated critical market forces
in the context of lucrative and recurrent criminal enterprises, common business decision-making may be
predicted and thereby controlled beyond a law enforcement paradigm. In fact, the paper argues that when
perverted law enforcement regulation operates as an inter-connecting market characteristic then it can
have a similar inﬂuence over illegitimate enterprise that law enforcement may provide legitimate business.
By establishing a richer and more enterprise-oriented understanding of crucial market variables, it
becomes possible to reﬁne control strategies at critical entry and exit points in the operation of clandestine
crime businesses. The paper will challenge a comparative theorising of what makes crime business a good
business, and how normative distinctions between illegitimate markets are made less convincing when
positioned against an analysis of the interaction of critical market variables.
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1. Introduction
The paper has two parts. Working from the hypothesis that market-based analysis is
crucial for empowering enterprise theory
1 and the insights it offers for understanding crime
business, we selectively identify critical market variables which shape this analysis. This
identiﬁcation is intended to suggest how conventional market analysis can be adapted to the
understanding of crime business, but more particularly to open up the argument that market
regulation has a powerful inﬂuence over the way market variables accommodate crime
business, and how distorted regulation can mirror the market impact of legitimate regulatory
frames. Following a broad discussion of these variables the paper moves on to select
a particular interaction of two variables which inﬂuences both demand and supply market
forces, and discusses its operation in more speciﬁc business relationships and contexts.
2 By
this point the paper will have:
  Conceptualised criminal enterprise in a way whereby its normative distinction can be
separated from its market motivations;
  Set out an interpretation of universal market conditions in which legitimate and illegitimate
enterprise can operate to achieve similar market motivations;
  Selected critical market variables which act in uniform and predictable fashion to enhance
different aspects of market motivation while adapting to the distinct market needs of
legitimate and illegitimate enterprise;
  From these variables focused on the role of distorted regulatory forces and their interaction
with other variables important in the construction of supply and demand; and
  Drawn parallels between the regulatory inﬂuence of legitimate and illegitimate regulatory
frames for speciﬁc crime businesses.
In setting out to contest two ‘articles of faith’ in conventional organised crime research, the
following analysis takes on a task which in overview form can do no more than present the
bones of an argument and directions for further elaboration. This paper is an extension of our
1Enterprise theory of crime understands the organisation of criminal behaviour as reﬂective of speciﬁc market or
economic forces, inﬂuencing the motivations of criminals, how they interact, their perceptions of risk versus beneﬁt, and
the efﬁciency and efﬁcacy of their motivation.
Under this theory, organised crime exists because legitimate markets leave many customers and potential customers
unsatisﬁed (Smith, 1978). High demand for a particular good or service, low levels of risk detection and high proﬁts lead
to a conducive environment for entrepreneurial criminal groups to enter the market and proﬁt by supplying those goods
and services. For success, there must be:
  an identiﬁed market; and
  a certain rate of consumption (demand) to maintain proﬁt and outweigh perceived risks (Albanese, 2000, 2008).
Under these conditions competition is discouraged, or regulated to sustain proﬁts (Smith, 1991). Albanese’s (2004,
p. 4) deﬁnition of organised crime is as follows: Organised crime is a continuing criminal enterprise that rationally
works to proﬁt from illicit activities that are often in great public demand. Its continuing existence is maintained
through the use of force, threats, monopoly control, and/or the corruption of public ofﬁcials.
2This selection is limited to those forces we believe are indicative of the comparative potential of this analysis. A
richer analysis of these and other forces and relationships is developed in the doctoral thesis of Hanif (forthcoming).
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work in market modelling criminal enterprise
3 and is only intended to sign-post deeper
considerations from rich research ﬁndings.
4 Particularly in this piece we challenge:
a) The presumption that crime business can only be viewed in the context of its operation
within an illegitimate market structure, therefore functionally and structurally setting apart
criminal enterprise (and its understandings) from that of legitimate business; and
b) The consequent conclusion that if market analysis is applied to criminal enterprise it can
only be done so as to conﬁrm the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate markets.
The second part of the paper sketches out from the relationship between two critical market
variables, how speciﬁc comparative analysis of different criminal enterprises exhibiting
different entrepreneurial motivations
5 inﬂuence and are inﬂuenced by the interaction between
uniform market variables. Put simply, if our thesis is correct that:
  Conventional market analysis, set free from legitimate/illegitimate normative distinctions,
can assist in understanding the market motivations of criminal enterprise
  Uniform market variables can be identiﬁed for the purpose of such analysis
  Those variables remain constant across legitimate and illegitimate enterprise, while
adapting in operation to the distinctions between these enterprises;
  Such variables adapt but also remain constant across different crime business types, and
  In particular for the purposes of this paper, the central principles of regulatory theory in
inﬂuencing market conditions (and relating to other crucial variables) adapt but remain
constant, legitimate to illegitimate enterprise, and across different crime business types.
The later point in the above hypothesis requires detailed empirical testing which cannot in
the constraints of a paper such as this, be achieved in any convincing form.
6 All that will be
offered here in the second part of the paper is comparative analytical methodology
7 which can
be employed within and between speciﬁc criminal enterprises to test for the theoretical
continuity of a uniform market analysis to distinctly different forms of crime business. The
focus in this part will be the inﬂuence of regulatory forces on the construction and maintenance
of other critical market variables such as product preferencing.
8
The paper concludes by returning to the necessity for normative reﬂection on illegitimate
and legitimate markets,
9 and what makes business criminal. We accept the importance of
normative distinctions and value-laden meanings for criminal enterprise and its consequences,
where political determinations need to inﬂuence policy developments in crime control. That
said, we retain our caution that evidence-based policy creation and law making need to know
3See Findlay and Hanif (forthcoming) ‘Disturbing the Rice Pot: Market modelling criminal enterprise’.
4Detailed in the doctoral thesis of Hanif (forthcoming), and the sole intellectual property of that author.
5‘Entrepreneurial orientation refers to the processes, practices (pro-activeness, risk taking behaviour and innova-
tiveness) and decision-making activities used by entrepreneurs that lead to the initiation of an entrepreneurial enterprise’
(Gottschalk, 2009, p. 14).
6This empirical comparison is being carried out by the second author as part of her doctoral thesis and remains her
sole intellectual property.
7The methodology is ‘comparative contextual analysis’ detailed in Findlay and Henham (2007, pp. 117e121).
8Hanif and Findlay, 2010a.
9Ruggiero, 2000; Antonopoulos, 2008.
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the difference between uniform market analysis of crime business and its regulation, separate
from other externalities such as normative proscription.
The next section sets out simply to indicate the manner in which we intend to employ the
concept of enterprise in order to give substance to our analysis of:
  the dynamics of crime business;
  its complementarity with other competing business enterprises;
  its market positioning
  the extent to which market motivation accounts for structuring and operationalising crime
business;
  the signiﬁcance of regulatory cross-over in establishing and maintaining market posi-
tioning; and
  how to particularise the utility of enterprise theory in promoting a universalised market
understanding of crime business, especially from a regulatory perspective.
2. Distinguishing criminal enterprise
Any application of enterprise theory to market conditions where proﬁtability rather than
enterprise legitimacy is the focus, could be criticised as taking the crime out of crime business.
When dichotomous interpretations of business (criminal or not) and markets (legitimate or
illegitimate) are challenged through modelling common conditions of enterprise proﬁtability
and market positioning, the researcher is left to determine the nature of crime business rather
than to explain it away.
10
Regulation and product preferencing are universal market conditions. Legalist regulation
11
in its corrupt or unlawful forms facilitates crime business and can assist in product prefer-
encing but despite its inﬂuence over proﬁtability, distorted or inverted regulatory services do
not gain their ‘marketability’ in economic terms alone.
12 It is the potential of legalist regulation
to transfer the mask of legitimacy to criminal enterprise and the preferencing of its products and
services which makes the retention of an appearance of regulatory legitimacy for the corrupt
public ofﬁcial critical to his or her market value. In this respect to speak of legalist regulators as
‘cross-over’ players bridging legitimate and illegitimate enterprises (not to be confused with
markets) is much more complicated than the transition implies. It is more helpful to see the
legalist regulator and their service to the market as what we refer to as legitimacy transaction,
a common feature of the regulator’s utility when interacting with legitimate business enterprise.
This will be addressed in greater detail later.
10Paoli, 2002.
11The conceptual parallel between legalist and legal regulation exists insofar as the regulatory power of the social
control agents, institutions and bureaucratic processes in both contexts is derived from their legal standing. In the
service provision sense legalist regulatory practices refer to the discretionary granting and/or withdrawal of opportu-
nities, authorisation, favours, privileges and other market access variables. The deviant dimension of legalist regulation
involves the abuse of public power for private proﬁt by legally authorised regulators who hold positions in legitimate
socio-political apparatuses, and are in our case-studies, by extension candidates for elected ofﬁce. By extension legalist
regulators can compromise candidates for elective ofﬁces, through informal methods or by manipulating formal
bureaucratic processes, in order to gain preferences and protections for the enterprises which they service. Across
cultural contexts, various studies have identiﬁed extortion, intimidation, bribery, gift-giving, nepotism, and
patroneclient networks to be among the foundation for the institutionalisation of legalist regulatory practices.
12Hanif and Findlay, 2010a; see also Khan (1998).
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In attempting to habilitate a market consciousness into the understanding of criminal
enterprise engaged in by rational entrepreneurs and regulators, several counter intuitive chal-
lenges need to be confronted.
2.1. Research reluctance
The analysis of crime as a business, with an emphasis on the market motivation of rational
entrepreneurs and self-interested regulators as rational service providers, rather than simply as
irrational, disorganised and violent criminals has been hesitant in the language of law
enforcement policy as well as criminology theorising.
13 The receptivity among criminologists
to equate organised crime as an enterprise has not naturally redirected analytical gaze towards
organised crime entrepreneurs as market players.
2.2. Disorganised organisational thinking
From the rudimentary, hierarchically organised street corner criminal groups to the complex
and sophisticated organisation of a crime syndicate, crime business and collective criminality
is organised according to the market structure and culture in which these criminal groups
operate. Criminal groups that attempt to take advantage of the criminal market require
structural advantage to maximise the market opportunities available to them as they compete
with other criminal groups, as is the case with any other business.
14 The inﬂuence of business
environment over business structure and models sees a parallel in legitimate business
enterprise.
2.3. Misconceiving structural market adaptation
An example of structural adaptation generating business advantage in criminal enterprise is
what might be seen as logically confounding when put against law enforcement normative
distinction; the symbiosis between crime business and otherwise legitimate market regulators.
15
We will examine this as a critical market variable in more detail later in the paper. For now it is
mentioned to throw light on the importance of structural adaptivity in the advancement of
criminal enterprise as proﬁtable business. The crucial function of corrupt regulators in facili-
tating criminal enterprise is a direct consequence of the unique and strategic location of social
regulators along the porous boundary that separates the legitimate and the illegitimate sectors of
society,
16 and contextualises legitimate and illegitimate enterprise across consistent market
conditions. Whether illicit social actors are able to run an uninterrupted criminal enterprise, to
expand criminal enterprise on a global scale, to permeate market economies in an expansionist
business mode, are dependent on the corruptibility of social regulators and compromised
regulatory boundaries.
17
13For reservations in theorising crime as business in the law enforcement perspective, see: Werthman and Piliavin,
1967; Whish, 2003; for reservations in theorising crime as business among criminologists, see: Reuter, 1983; van
Duyne, 1997; Paoli, 2002.
14Findlay, 1993; van Duyne, 1997; Hanif and Findlay, 2010a.
15See Ruggiero, 2002, 2010; Zhang, 2008; Hanif and Findlay, 2010a.
16Royal Malaysia Police, 2005, p. 280; Hanif and Findlay, 2010a.
17Hanif and Findlay, 2010a.
342 M. Findlay, N. Hanif / International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice 40 (2012) 338e368Author's personal copy
2.4. Down-playing agency
Next to structural adaptivity, agency is critical to the advancement of crime business and the
realisation of varied market motivations to expand and diversify successful crime business in
a modern market context. Agency in the organisation of crime is a series of negotiated inter-
actions and relationships between key players. The least common denominator of organised
criminality is human relationships; speciﬁcally human relationships engaged in the process of
social networking for the provision of illicit goods and services as well as the protection,
regulation and extortion of those engaged in the provision or consumption of these goods and
services.
18 This process of social networking occurs as part of a social system of organised
crime, a system which explains the remarkable consistency of the process of organising crime
across time and space. This process of networking also has cultural variants, a phenomenon that
explains the subtle and not-so-subtle differences between organised criminals of different
ethnic heritages. Organisational identities, structural loyalties and the empathetic facilitation of
corrupt regulators must be contextualised in particular market contexts in order to understand
agency. Agency is a relative market relationship, and not just a structural delegation. For
instance, it is enlightening to appreciate the way corrupt regulators perceive their own agency
and involvement in the organisation of criminal enterprises in order to critically reveal their
motivations beyond ﬁnancial enrichment.
19 Corrupt regulators are a fundamental variable in the
market proﬁtability of the criminal network.
20 At the same time, and to increase their
commercial utility while maintaining a mask of respectability and authority, these corrupt
regulators distract their primary role in organised crime by distorting knowledge. The ideo-
logical representation of crime, the misrepresentation of market reality through selective law
enforcement, the doctoring of statistics on crime in order to inﬂuence public perception of law
enforcement effectiveness, to create or assuage moral panic and to appease the national and
international community have been documented.
21 The perpetuation of false consciousness and
the ideological discursive representation of crime by corrupt regulators deﬂect critical attention
from and suspicion of the porosity of the boundary between the legitimate and illegitimate
enterprise. The agency of corrupt regulators in facilitating criminal enterprise is holistic in that
their role in dictating knowledge about crime enables them to divert attention away from their
role as a gel between the legitimate and illegitimate enterprise in common market contexts.
22
Agency needs to be contextually deﬁned. Corrupt regulators attest to the multiple loyalties,
functions, identities that inﬂuence their action or agency.
2.5. Limiting regulation to objectiﬁed law enforcement
Regulation as a critical market variable of criminal enterprise is rarely fully appreciated as
a fundamental feature of successful crime business. The establishment, proﬁtability and
sustainability of criminal enterprises, we later argue in more detail, is dependent on legalist
regulation which despite this critical facilitation is very much neglected in theorisations of
organised crime. The relative success of criminal entrepreneurs to operate a stable, predictable,
18McIllwain, 1999.
19Hanif and Findlay, 2010a.
20Shakantu, 2003; Hanif and Findlay, 2010a.
21Johnson, 1962; Ianni, 1972; Ekblom, 2003; Block, 1991.
22Hanif and Findlay, 2010a.
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proﬁtable and sustainable criminal enterprise is contingent on their degree of success in
securing the collaborative relationships of legalist regulators. Contrary to the normative
assumption that regulation is antithetical to crime business, this paper will show legalist
regulation to be a critical variable of market dynamics that secures criminal market presence
and share.
23
2.6. Single variant ﬁxation
Law enforcement investigations into the organised crime problem are preoccupied with
ascertaining whether organised crime groups are hierarchically structured or loose networks of
criminal associates and whether their organisation in particular ways pose external threats to
otherwise ‘licit’ political-economies.
24 With such an emphasis the dynamics of crime business
culture and market involvement escape consideration in favour of a structuralist concern for
organisations and the ‘holy grail’ of what makes them criminogenic; family, race, ethnicity,
secrecy, opportunityetc.Subcultureethnographies,whoseanalyticalfocus istheidentiﬁcation of
taxonomies to describe organised crime groups (as ethnically-based, indigenous or non-
indigenous, hierarchically structured or networked), are concerned with the regularities,
common patterns and distinguishing features of organised crime groups, where these groups
operateandinwhatmarkets.
25Intheresultantconstrainedresearchagendatheresearchers’focus
is channelled towards the mundane and distinctive features of illegitimate markets and sectors of
society in terms of preconceived single variable analytical frameworks whether in terms of
positivist biology, subculture’s race and class or social disorganisation’s ecology.
26 Methodol-
ogies which then direct the research gaze to low level operatives and street-crime relationships
maytendtoconﬁrmtheutilityofmundaneandlimitedvariantanalysisnotasaconsequenceofits
empiricalsigniﬁcancebutthroughaconcurrencewiththenormativecommitmentsoftheseminor
players.
27 These normative commitments in turn may have been consciously conﬁrmed and
proliferated bymorepowerful entitiesinthe enterprise determinedtoconceal thecomplexitiesof
power and to keep the lower orders unstable, factionalised and violent so as to restrict their
commercial access to the orderly proﬁts and expertise of the business.
2.7. Ignoring rational business dynamics
As we will discuss more fully later, normalisation, be it the province of regulators, entre-
preneurs or consumers, is contingent on the dynamic collaborative relationship negotiated
between the criminal enterprise and other critical market variables such as the legalist regulator,
which is vital in securing the enterprise’s market presence and share. The cooperative rela-
tionship negotiated between the syndicate and various legalist regulators advances the interests
of criminal business in a variety of ways. A key challenge for developing our understanding of
illicit enterprise is to pursue a more qualitative interpretation of the actual decision-making
processes engaged in by illicit traders. In particular, the hypothesis that actors rationally
anticipate the actions of those charged with their regulation and take evasive action provides
23See Findlay and Hanif (forthcoming) ‘Disturbing the Rice Pot: Market modelling criminal enterprise’.
24Edwards and Levi, 2008, p. 364.
25Edwards and Levi, 2008, p. 366.
26McIllwain, 1999.
27Hanif and Findlay, 2010b.
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a useful starting-point for questioning the degree to which different traders approximate to
a “perfect knowledge” about the actual and potential actions of competitors and regulators
operating in the markets they inhabit. In questioning the logic of entrepreneurial practice there
is always a danger of over-emphasising the voluntary exercise of choice by particular traders,
especially given the methodological individualism of rational actor models.
Having overviewed our appreciation and application of enterprise and its critical compo-
nents when analysing crime business we are now in a position to frame out the signiﬁcance and
structure of conventional market analysis in which to locate the uniform dynamics and to test
the speciﬁc adaptation of illegitimate enterprise as crime business.
3. Maximising choice/minimising competition
As suggested earlier, an analysis of the market variables at work in the proﬁtability of crime
business helps expose the normative distinctions which retard other theoretical and methodo-
logical approaches which are based on the intractable distinction between legitimate and ille-
gitimate markets, good and bad business.
29 Contemporary organised crime analyses and research
methodologies are replete with the dichotomised representations of businesses, markets and stake-
holders. The functions of criminal enterprise are positioned along the axis of ‘legal’ or ‘illegal’,
‘functional’ or ‘dysfunctional’ and ‘orderly’ or ‘disorderly’. These dualisms have been historically
institutionalised through principal analytical frameworks in criminology like positivism, Merton’s
social structure and anomie paradigm, sub-cultural studies and the ‘crime control’ law enforce-
ment perspective. Dialectical theorisations conceal the dynamic reality of criminal networks
30 and
enterprises, and stunt efforts to realistically appreciate organised crime as business.
31
The market analysis we apply to the study of crime business operates under the following
pre-conditions:
a) That entrepreneurial motivation is inﬂuenced by market forces and relationships which can
be reduced down to critical market variables;
b) That critical market variables are present and inﬂuential to differing degrees across crime
business with distinctly different market conditions;
c) That critical market variables are present and inﬂuential across enterprises no matter if they
are normatively determined to be operating in legitimate or illegitimate markets; and
d) That market variables are employed in crime business in similar fashion to any other
enterprise context provided they are geared towards economic proﬁtability. In this respect
they may be directed at enhancing or restricting market choice, but as such they are always
focused on choice (rational or otherwise).
Market analysis, while a universalist exercise, must anticipate being tested in the speciﬁcs of
different market contexts which is the challenge for the comparative methodology advanced in
29In Findlay and Hanif (forthcoming) ‘International Conventions and the Failure of a Transnational Approach to
Controlling Asian Crime Business’ we draw the connection between legitimate and illegitimate enterprise within
common market conditions.
30The “criminal network” of an illegal entrepreneur refers to ‘all those individuals he or she encounters in the course of
his or her criminal activities who are in a position to inﬂuence the success or failure of that criminal enterprise’ (von
Lampe, 2007, p. 132).
31Morselli and Giguere, 2006.
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the second half of this paper. There is a need to understand the structures of different markets,
that is, how they unevenly distribute cultural, economic and political capital amongst
competing entrepreneurs and the consequences of this for the reproduction, stagnation or
collapse of particular markets. At the level of action at least the epistemology of crime business
is advanced through speciﬁc market modelling in particular enterprise contexts. The ontology
of crime business is not determined by the nature of markets but by the phenomenology applied
to their meaning and thereby their legitimacy.
Market analysis is central to predicting:
  whether criminal entrepreneurship is undertaken (addressing criminal inclinations, capacity
to undertake entrepreneurship depending on whether the group has capital
32; access to
illegitimate sector of society, etc.),
  how criminal entrepreneurship is organised in a particular market context (network or
hierarchical structure; race oriented? proﬁt oriented?), and
  which criminal entrepreneurship is undertaken and why (culturally determined demand,
assessing consumer demand, dissatisfactions, wants, needs).
Although conventionally studied from a supply perspective, market analysis can draw on
a range of subjects and perspectives; consumers, criminal entrepreneurs, legitimate entrepre-
neurs competing alongside illegal businesses, law enforcement agents, speciﬁc communities,
which dynamically interact and culminate in market forces. The problem with the supply
perspective is that it encourages the normative and dialectical tensions inherent in organised
crime study from an essentialist law enforcement perspective. If market analysis is done from
the perspective of a speciﬁc organised crime, with an over-emphasis on the organisational
distinction from legitimate enterprise such as the marketing of violence, difference itself
becomes an over-endowed independent variable that is presumed to affect the proﬁtability,
sustainability, and growth of crime business. The organisation becomes the control focus
towards which efforts to disrupt certain supply dimensions are invested. The resilience of
certain groups dealing in those supply commodities which law enforcement seeks to capture
distracts a more balanced consideration of market analysis wherein product preferencing and
the conditions inﬂuencing rational consumer choice are passed over.
Freed from any essentialist dichotomy between legitimate and illegitimate markets, we
argue that universal market characteristics, forces and relationships can explain criminal
enterprise and business in a similar way to market theorising for any enterprise or business. The
predictive powers offered by market analysis can be applied and tested across enterprises as
well as across broad market contexts. While it is argued that universal forces, characteristics
and relationships which make up market proﬁtability can explain the nature and operation of
criminal enterprise and entrepreneurial motivation in the same way as any other business under
the same market conditions, differences in crime business can also be explained through
different market conditions, and therefore are market speciﬁc.
Following the review of essential market forces common to market analysis and applied to
crime business, the next stage is to consider critical market variables and their dynamic
inﬂuence on market conditions. Our consideration of two such variables to follow is premised
on certain assumptions about their operation and their inﬂuence. For instance with consumer
32Cohen, 1955; Cloward and Ohlin, 1960; Bourgois, 2003; Brotherton, 2008.
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normalisation that we argue
33 is a critical market context for product preferencing decision-
making:
1) normalisation at critical decision sites in criminal enterprise is crucial for essential business
outcomes;
2) the impression that the stronger are forces of normalisation the weaker is the distinction
between legitimate and illegitimate enterprises;
3) that the forces of normalisation are context speciﬁc and diminished by the characteristics
and relationships (such as violence) that determine enterprise as more unambiguously
criminal; and
4) that forces of normalisation depend for their potency on the inverse market discrimination
of legalist regulators.
This paper can only of necessity limit its market analysis aspirations and the later
comparative methodology to two critical market variables; legalist regulation and product
preferencing. By establishing a richer and more enterprise-oriented understanding of a crucial
market variable such as these it will be possible to reﬁne control strategies at critical entry and
exit points in the operation of clandestine crime businesses. Furthermore, by exploring how one
variable inﬂuences the market context and dynamics of another (i.e. legalist regulation facili-
tating product preferencing) then the dynamic and interactive nature of market analysis is
revealed.
Therefore, we see the universal market inﬂuence of regulatory forces (legitimate or ille-
gitimate) as one critical market variable for achieving a proﬁt-centred understanding of crime
business. Certain underlying assumptions as to the regulatory signiﬁcance for market analysis
would be:
  Legalism and the creation of an optimal market context
  Legalism as a stimulant for the cross-over of legitimate and illegitimate economies,
entrepreneurs, enterprise, business strategies
  Legalism broadens the criminal network and criminal resources available to criminal
entrepreneurs
Prior to describing in more detail the critical market variables of legalist regulation inﬂu-
encing product preferencing, we need to clear up a further apparent paradox. How can we assert
that these selected variables are uniform market conditions if, when they are applied to
33The study of the normalisation of illicit goods and services and criminal business is really modelling the variables
that incline consumer demand for and endorsement of illicit goods and services. Normalisation is the manifestation of
structural forces that inﬂuence and diffuse into the decision-making process of consumers. The cumulative effect of
consumer-decision making processes subsequently inﬂuences the market presence of a particular criminal enterprise
within a particular context. To understand the process by which the culture of normalising criminal business is brought
about requires to understand deep-seated culture, a process of enculturation, the institutionalisation of corruption, etc.
Normalisation is an investigation into a way of life within a particular context. This way of life includes corrupt culture,
dealing with corruption, looking at informal ways of making money, gradual inclination towards deviance and crime. In
this way the services of corrupt police and public ofﬁcials assist in the normalisation process through a series of
complex and often masked and mystiﬁed market relationships. For a much more developed analysis of normalisation
and its place in demand management (which is the distinct intellectual property of the author Hanif N.) see the doctoral
thesis of Hanif (forthcoming).
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particular criminal enterprise they appear in an adaptive form? For instance legalist, cross-over
regulation is a market regulator but it is one where the anticipated regulatory inﬂuences of law
and legal process are corrupted and even reversed. The answer lies in common operational
market themes such as agency, power, knowledge-management, discretion and authority.
Another way of viewing the paradox is to see these variables emerging from a core market meta
source and then being adapted down to the particular exigencies of the different criminal
enterprise contexts. In this way, the variables can be viewed at their source down to their
operational entity as what we might call ‘crime adaptations’ e so for instance normalisation is
an adaptation of consumer choice which could be seen as coming out of demand management;
cross over legalist regulation grows out of law enforcement regulation which could be seen as
coming from supply management. This is how we will envisage and employ the selected market
variables in the analysis to follow.
4. Legalist regulation
The role played by discretionary regulators in promoting crime identiﬁes market regulation
as crucial in promoting favourable market conditions to advance the interests of criminal
entrepreneurs, as might be expected of regulatory forces for stimulating legitimate enterprise.
34
With the institutionalisation of compromised regulatory agency at each progressive stage of
criminal business, from the resourcing, production, marketing, to the import and export of
illegal commodities, it can be shown that the divide between the legitimate and illegitimate
enterprises becomes blurred.
35 Legalist regulators conﬂate the market in which legitimate and
illegitimate enterprises and entrepreneurs operate and compete. Legalist regulation in these
settings facilitates the convergence and cross-over between legitimate and illegitimate market
enterprise share instead of denying the attraction of the alternative market conditions.
Discretionary regulation functions to bridge markets and economies, speciﬁcally by stimulating
a consumption pattern that is partial to illicit goods and services. Such a pattern of dealing with
legalist regulation is designed to show normalisation as a dynamically negotiated market
context.
36
The ofﬁces of legal regulators are legitimately accorded the coercive power of the state, in
exercising their authority and powers as instrumentalities and agents of the state and its
regulatory process. With state-invested power to prohibit or compel, to take or give reward, the
practises of these state-appointed and legalised regulators can and do selectively help or hurt
enterprises and entrepreneurs. The machinery and power of the state represents a potential
resource or restriction to every market player, including illegitimate enterprise. The capacity of
law enforcement regulators to exercise the apex powers of the regulatory pyramid
37 (coercive
34In his recent work Regulatory Capitalism: how it works, ideas for making it work better (2008) John Braithwaite
questions the convention that too much regulation hurts market proﬁtability. At least in the case of global multi-national
capitalism there has been an explosion in regulatory activity in the past decade and Braithwaite argues that the current
dominion of global corporate capitalism and its expanding market share is in no small measure due to regulatory
environments. This assertion should be measured against Braithwaite’s other conviction, that the regulatory theory
behind regulatory strategies which support healthy market conditions needs to be pluralistic and responsive. His own
preferred theoretical approach is a mix of limited command and control progressing down through tri-partism, to
a broad-based compliance and self-regulatory foundations.
35Hanif and Findlay, 2010a.
36Hanif and Findlay, 2010a.
37Rose-Ackerman, 1978; Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000; Hanif and Findlay, 2010a.
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sanctions) is a service worth paying for if guaranteed market positioning is something an
entrepreneur does not want to leave to organic market forces. Regulation is the mechanical
overlay in which these organic forces are played out and as a consequence can be viewed as
a far more manageable and marketable critical variable.
Legalist regulation advance crime business by:
(1) pressuring the incorporation of illegal corporate strategies within legitimate enterprise
models, and
(2) directly cooperating with legitimate entrepreneurs.
Legalist regulation intervenes at all points of legitimate and criminal enterprises, and
inﬂuences crucial market dynamics and structures affecting both legitimate and illegitimate
business. Legalist regulation inclines particular business sectors towards criminality as a mode
of adaptation, as well as the market towards crime business proﬁt and sustainability. In this
regard, market positioning through cross-over facilitation and consumer preferencing through
normalisation will be central analytical reﬂections for any effective market analysis. Regula-
tion, we suggest, is a unique market variable through the manner in which it constructs critical
contexts in which other variables such as product preferencing become essential market
decision outcomes.
38
5. Oligopolistic market context favouring criminal enterprise e dangers of the free
market
It has been observed of crime business that it operates more effectively in market conditions
of limited competition
39. For those seeking to cast criminal enterprise as somehow destructive
of legitimate market conditions this tendency to oligopoly is seen as proof that crime business
and the forces that foster it are opposed to free market economy.
40 Such a distinction, we
suggest, is naive at best on at least two levels. First it represents a shallow and normative
equation of legitimate market conditions always requiring free and unrestricted competition.
This is the foundation of equally unrealistic critiques of market regulation in any form for what
is seen as some universal potential of regulation to restrict market freedom.
41 Braithwaite
(2008), at least for large multi-national corporations, argues that the burgeoning of interna-
tional networked regulation in recent times can only be explained as good for the essential
conditions of global capitalism. This leads to the second misconception and that relates to some
uniform ascription to oligopoly of negative market connotations. In the delivery of particular
goods and services (such as those with high R&D and intellectual property start up costs)
oligopolies are common in the most legitimate market forms such as IT services or branded
consumer product.
Public choice theories of regulation analogise regulatory decision-making to market
decision-making. In such situations individuals who are, or could be effected by regulation
38Hanif and Findlay, 2010a.
39Works in which crime business is seen as anti-competitive: Reuter, 1983; Paoli, 2002; Thoumi, 1995; Tremblay et al.,
1998.
40Works that argue crime business destroys market legitimacy: Tilly, 1985; Sterling, 1994; Mittleman and Johnston,
1995.
41This position is interrogated by Croley (1998).
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exchange regulatory goods which are demanded and supplied according to the same principles
governing demand and supply of ordinary goods in the market. Such regulatory goods can
include:
  Subsidies
  Selective restriction of market entry as through tariffs
  Control over the substitutes and complements of economic goods
  Price controls
  Supply and demand pathway controls
  Consumer segregation
For those willing to engage regulatory goods, the beneﬁts for their market positioning can be
signiﬁcant. Rather than necessarily anti-competitive in context and consequence there can
prevail a competitive condition for the supply and demand for these regulatory goods.
In the law enforcement context the state is the sole supplier of regulatory goods. Through
legalist regulation by corrupt state agents regulatory trades are offered to criminal entrepre-
neurs to further their mutual economic interests. ‘The resources necessary to meet the supplier’s
political needs constitutes the price of regulatory goods’.
42 The outcomes for such forces of
supply and demand will be a function of the market (and non-market) constraints under which
participants in the regulatory marketplace operate. For legalist regulators we will discuss these
constraints in the section to follow.
As attractive as the parallel between regulatory decision-making and market decision-making
may appear, for legitimate market regulation at least, there are challenges to the analogy.
  Regulatory decisions can be ‘all-or-nothing’ propositions rather than what happens
commonly with market prioritisation.
  The scope of regulatory decisions extends across almost all participants in the market.
  Once the state makes a decision about which package of regulatory goods it intends to
supply there is no opportunity for market players to exit the regulatory market.
  Regulatory decisions are more likely to be permanent.
  Regulatory decisions are usually collective decisions.
  Relative to market decisions, regulatory decisions are relatively infrequent.
However, these distinguishers are less apparent when the supplier of regulatory goods is
a legalist regulator. In the context in which regulatory goods are offered by legalist regulators
and accepted by criminal entrepreneurs, the regulatory market works to the advantage of
organised groups with narrow interests such as crime syndicates and corrupt police.
43 Regu-
latory goods as with any marketable product must be worth the price. The beneﬁt may be the
restriction of competition in situations where perverted and selective law enforcement replace
the need for violence from the criminal entrepreneur directed against his competitors. Where
such regulatory goods are sold to organised, concentrated interests, as our research reveals, the
rewards focus at the top of the syndicate and are dispersed and diminished as they move down
the enterprise pyramid.
44
42Croley, 1998, p. 58.
43Hanif and Findlay, 2010a.
44Hanif and Findlay, 2010a.
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6. Cross-over e challenge to market designations of legitimacy
The notion of maximisation can be applied to any facilitator or opportunist within a criminal
enterprise or crime business relationship, regulator or otherwise.
45 Certain styles of legalist
regulator can be seen as maximisers but not all. As we interpret the concept of maximisation it
is not about crime parasitic self-interest, but the mutualised interests of criminal enterprise
stimulated through the trade in regulatory goods. The legalist regulators feeding off con-
sequentialist criminal enterprise
46 may not be maximisers in the enterprise sense. They bleed
the business for individualist reasons of self interest and eventually kill the enterprise. Any
maximisation role is for the legalist regulator alone and thereby short lived.
By examining maximising legalist regulators who provide this cross-over facilitation, the
conceptual framework of mutualised criminal enterprise becomes extremely constructive in
enabling the study of criminal network relationships at all business levels. In so doing enter-
prise analysis transcends dialectical tensions and dichotomies to the reveal dynamic coopera-
tion that makes for proﬁtable business.
47
An underlying aspiration and consequence of the enterprise/regulatory cross over is the
establishment and maintenance of market ordering. In conventional organised crime analysis
disorder features as a crucial discriminator of illegitimate business. The reverse is the expe-
rience of syndicate senior management in our case study and argues against the order/disorder
dichotomy in crime business.
48
Oscillation legal to illegal businesses requires examination in light of the market activity
and organisational structures in which and by which they operate. The array of important
relationships, which result from the necessary interplay between market activity and
organisational structure, must be understood. Otherwise the representation of criminal
enterprise will forever be stylised by distracted dichotomies (legitimate business versus the
syndicate), moralising psychologising (legitimate businessmen being corrupted by mobsters),
and a tacit belief in an alien spectre seducing away the virginal purity of the illusive free
market (inﬁltration of legitimate business).
49 The normative without the active is a recipe for
analytical apology regarding the daily proﬁt motivations of crime business and facilitating
corruption.
Some important questions arise for an analysis of the symbiosis between legalist regulators
and crime business. To what extent does the paradox of cross over regulation require nor-
malisation at various crucial sites of market decision-making and between essential market
players? How are both the paradoxes of:
a) legalist regulation facilitating rather than frustrating crime business, and
b) regulatory cross-over as a challenge to rather than a conﬁrmation of distinctions based on
market legitimacy,
45Murphy and Robinson, 2008.
46For a discussion of the division of crime business into consequentialist and maximising criminal enterprises see
Findlay and Hanif (forthcoming) ‘Disturbing the Rice Pot’.
47Hanif and Findlay, 2010a.
48Hanif and Findlay, 2010a; A richer analysis of these and other forces and relationships is developed in the doctoral
thesis of Hanif (forthcoming).
49Martin, 1981.
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particularly tied to normalisation as critical market variables when we are arguing for a uniform
market modelling approach premised on a freedom from externally mechanical and norma-
tively compromised distinctions of market legitimacy?
The normalisation of legalist or corrupt regulatory trading is contingent on the dynamic
collaborative relationship negotiated between the syndicate and legalist regulator, which is
critical in securing the syndicate’s market presence and share. The cooperative relationship
negotiated between the syndicate and various legalist regulators can be shown to advance the
interests of criminal business in a variety of ways including:
  Discretionary policing of competitors who aim to usurp the syndicate’s market share and
presence,
  Overlooking the legal prosecution of consumers and more importantly the original sources
of illicit product and services,
  Facilitating the stable operations of criminal business,
  Laundering criminal capital to fund other criminal business.
But in turn these interests rely on mirroring the beneﬁcial inﬂuences brought about by regu-
lation for general market competitiveness; sometimes even including oligopolistic outcomes.
7. Regulation in reverse
As indicated previously we see the regulatory paradox embodied in otherwise law
enforcement agencies offering regulatory services to facilitate crime business as operating in
a uniform market-driven frame and not just in some normative tension focussed on the ‘moral
corruptibility of individual agents’.
50 For crime business situations, legalist regulation can work
contrary to the expected purpose of restricting what is determined in law enforcement parlance
as illegitimate or black market operations. As a result, in analysing the market conditions for
crime business (and hence the risks to designated legitimate enterprises) legalist regulation
crosses over porous normative market divides (which in many respects their agencies and
institutions have designated and maintained) creating opportunities to inﬂuence consumer
preference. This is achieved by favouring particular market players and practises in reward for
corrupt relationships, and by restricting access and participation in legitimate and illegitimate
markets by disfavoured business.
51 Legalist regulation can also create and maintain commercial
conditions which favour crime business products ahead of legitimate service providers.
Associated with this, compromised regulators can use or refrain from criminalisation which in
turn impacts on the normalisation of illegitimate commercial trade. In this way the negotiation
of meanings by compromised regulators helps re-imagine crime business to support consumer
normalisation, and market preference.
Clearly the institutionalisation of legalist regulation blurs the now normative distinction
between good and bad business, operating in legitimate and illegitimate markets, and
50As Potter (1994, p. 10) expertly explains: ‘To suggest that righteous citizens are being perverted, intimidated, and
forced into vice by alien forces is far more palatable than suggesting that “native” demands for illicit drugs, sex, and
gambling invite the creation of organised crime groups’.
51Corrupt regulators use their legitimate law enforcement authority to selectively enforce and ‘over-police’ other
business enterprises impacting on their free access to consumers and suppliers and thereby their competitive viability.
This is what we referred to above as legitimacy transaction masking discriminatory applications of law enforcement
power, and anti-competitive over-regulation.
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emphasises the legaleillegal continuum of markets and enterprise. This is the terrain through
which legalist regulatory agencies market the regulatory paradox.
52
8. Regulatory protectionism e limiting market competition
We have already observed the danger in seeing legalist regulation as opposed to market
viability and thereby challenging anything but illegitimate market analysis. That said, the
regulatory goods offered by corrupt market ofﬁcials have the capacity to exacerbate mechanical
market inequalities and distort resource distribution which is sometimes generally criticised as
the negative consequence of modern capitalism.
53
Corruption can help preserve objective inequalities in two ways: by facilitating the
unequal appropriation of wealth and privileges, and by inhibiting changes which could
threaten existing advantages.
54
Lets apply these two direction to the creation of oligopolistic market positioning which we
indicated above is not uniquely but particularly conducive to criminal enterprise, by
restricting organic competition in an otherwise de-regulated market. Legalist regulators will
use their licit and illicit standing as regulators to offer the service of anti-competitive
protection.
Corrupt regulation to aid the appropriation of wealth and privilege is a ‘two-way’ rela-
tionship whereby the criminal entrepreneur is given market positioning through the intimidation
of competitors, selective sanctioning of other market players, and licence protection and
product access. The corrupt regulator is enriched through ‘direct taking’ such as bribes and
kick-backs, embezzlement and extortion. The type of corrupt regulation more likely to protect
market inequalities by inhibiting change is exchange corruption where through quid pro quo
transactions with other key market players the criminal entrepreneur gains a continued market
advantage and a reliable and recurrent customer base while the corrupt regulator is paid by
participants in these relationships as a facilitator and agent.
Exchanges require a convergence of self interest among participants: once this is attained,
those involved often have an interest in repeated exchanges in the future. Exchange
corruption frequently eases imbalances in supply and demand, and can also pre-empt or
postpone politically disruptive reforms. These effects should be all the more pervasive to
the extent that exchanges are repetitive and become routine expectation.
55
As the regulatory trade becomes institutionalised into an essential market variable with the
capacity to normalise critical sites for market decision-making such as product preferencing,
the relationship between the supplier and the consumer of regulatory goods looks less like one
of domination and dependency and more like other proﬁtable and orderly market transactions.
Even so, the illicit nature of the relationship involves risk no matter how it is minimised. In the
52It appears from the responses to our interviews with consequentialist crime businessmen that the root causes of
corrupt activities come from government ofﬁcials, clients or contractors. This ﬁnding is similar to that of Shakantu. The
legalist regulatory demands and impositions (counter regulatory culture) practiced by compromised regulators neces-
sitate legitimate entrepreneurs to incorporate illegitimate business strategies in their everyday operationalisation.
53Posner, 2008.
54Johnson, 1989, p. 20.
55Johnson, 1989, pp. 21e22.
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shadow of that risk may remain an incipient mistrust which is kept in check by fragile
externalities such as the threat of violent reprisal, or exposure, in return for the withdrawal of
advantage. We will now brieﬂy consider the market conditions necessary for the maintenance of
networks of dependency and advantage wherein legalist regulation itself is normalised and at
the same time is a powerful force for normalisation.
9. Networks of dependence and advantage e creating and maintaining corruption
Certain commercial aspirations (entrepreneurial motivations) especially where these are
ambiguous or polyglot, and incentives for market advantage act as opportunities for corrup-
tion.
56 Along with such opportunities there is the capacity through often obscurest interactions
between various networks of authority for the corrupt supplier of regulatory goods to ‘add
value’ to his cross-over services. This is regulatory legitimation.
The conceptual parallel between legalist and legal regulation exists insofar as the regu-
latory power of the social control agents, institutions and bureaucratic processes in both
contexts is derived from their legal standing.
57 In the service provision sense, legalist
regulatory practices refer to the discretionary granting and/or withdrawal of opportunities,
authorisation, favours, privileges and other market access variables. The deviant dimension of
legalist regulation involves the abuse of public power for private proﬁt by legally authorised
regulators who hold positions in legitimate socio-political apparatuses, and are in our case-
studies, by extension candidates for elected ofﬁce. By extension legalist regulators
58 can
compromise candidates for elective ofﬁces, through informal methods or by manipulating
formal bureaucratic processes, in order to gain preferences and protections for the enterprises
which they service.
Legalist regulators and legalist regulation are marketable commodities. Not every criminal
group is able to secure the collaborative relationship of legalist regulators because it is an
expensive commodity. For those criminal entrepreneurs left out of the regulatory trade the
consequences as noted above can be even more market negative than if the trade was not
excluded from them. These small crime businesses are often, through discriminatory regulation,
sucked into dependency relationships with legalist regulators, minus the advantage. Through
processes such as extortion the relationship between the regulator and the excluded crime
business is predatory and parasitic. If the crime business is made unproﬁtable or non-viable
through the relationship then the regulator has added further value to his goods and trade for
those with whom he has an advantageous relationship.
It is also worth noting that legalist regulators differ in their ‘market price’ depending on their
capacity and the degree to which they are able to deliver a market context that is expected by
criminal entrepreneurs. Depending on their position in the bureaucratic structure in which they
56Findlay, 2008, p. 63.
57Hanif and Findlay, 2010a.
58Legalist regulators do not simply refer to police. Other regulators like moneychangers, directors of banks are equally
important as regulators between the legitimate and illegitimate enterprises. Their corruptibility portends the intertwining
of legitimate and illegitimate economies, the safeguarding of proceeds from criminal enterprises by diverting them into
legitimate institutions like the bank and legitimate businesses, the exponential growth of criminal capital, and the ease
with which criminal capital ﬂows on a global scale to fund other legitimate and illegitimate enterprises. Investigations
into criminal enterprises reveal many boundary regulators and what their corruptibility reveals for the understanding of
criminal organisation.
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serve, legalist regulators differ in their ability to negotiate optimal conditions to advance the
interests of the criminal entrepreneurs and the criminal network they serve. Securing legalist
regulation is a negotiated and dynamic process.
59
The crucial function of corrupt regulators in facilitating criminal enterprise is a direct
consequence of the unique and strategic location of social regulators along the boundary that
separates the legitimate and the illegitimate sectors of society. In treading the boundary
between the legitimate and illegitimate sectors of society, regulators are uniquely placed at
an intersection that determines the sustainability of criminal endeavour or their demise.
Whether illicit social actors are able to run an uninterrupted criminal enterprise, to expand
criminal enterprise on a global scale, to permeate what is normatively determined as the
legitimate market economy, are dependent on the corruptibility of social regulators and
compromised regulatory boundaries. Corrupt regulators can only be the gel between the
legitimate and illegitimate sectors of society and function as facilitators if their position in
legitimate society is not openly compromised and they continue to be involved in and
knowledgeable of boundary regulation procedures of the legitimate sector of society. The
positions that corrupt regulators occupy in the legitimate sector of society and their skil-
fulness in securing their legitimate identity are the currency that makes social regulators
‘marketable’ to illicit social actors.
Comparative features Criminal networks with the collaborative
relationship of legalist regulators
Criminal networks without legalist regulators
but only criminal regulators
Power source The ofﬁces of legal regulators are
legitimately infused with the coercive
power of the state, since they are
ideologically a machinery or function
of the governmentality process. With
state-invested power to prohibit or compel,
to take or give money, the practises of
these legal or state-appointed regulators
can and do selectively help or hurt
industries and entrepreneurs. The
regulatory machinery of the state
is a potential resource or threat to
every business form. The authority
of state sanctioned coercion imbues order
in the regulatory trade and
downplays violence.
Criminal regulators, referred to as assassins,
soldiers, ﬁghters, are typically members of
the criminal groups that they serve. Their
regulatory roles are appointed for them by
those occupying leadership positions in the
criminal group with which they are afﬁliated.
Their positions are recognised exclusively by
members of the particular criminal body they
are a part of. Their power is infused only with
and sanctioned by the authority of the criminal
leader that selected them. Without external
mechanical authority they trade violence
and disorder
Sphere of
inﬂuence
Legitimate and illegitimate
sectors of society
Illegitimate sector of society
Modus
operandi
A mixture of legal and extralegal method Exclusively extralegal method
Function   Deterring competing suppliers with
legal punishment
  Policing competing suppliers
  Regulating consumption
  Deterring competing suppliers
with violence
Machinery Legal coercion and regulatory ordering Physical violence and disorder
60
59Hanif and Findlay, 2010a.
60The graphs, ﬁgures and tables in this paper are from original ideas by the author Hanif N.
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10. Progressive and regressive market regulation e regulating to the normal
The market impact of legalist regulation over crime business is not static. It can be
progressive or regressive depending on the entrepreneur’s compliance (or ability to comply)
with the compromised or corrupt conditions of legalist regulation. It can begin as a facilitator of
crime business and deteriorate to become predatorial of criminal business and entrepreneurs.
For aggressive crime business (maximisers), or business induced to be criminal (con-
sequentialist), the compromised regulator imposes a parallel and inverted control regime to
legitimate regulatory conditions. That said both regulatory regimes are intended as proﬁt
maximisers in return for compliance by entrepreneurs.
Normalisation is a product of negotiations among key players in the criminal network, and
reliant on authentication by regulators in the market. It marks an important stage in the criminal
business life cycle. The device of harmonisation through regulatory trade endorses the stability
of criminal business as a source of income for all its players. It is hard to achieve and nego-
tiations, bribes rather than violence are the typical tools of legalist regulators. It is sometimes
unstable within shifting market conditions and can be challenged and re-arranged by competing
market variables such as including higher demands by the regulators, attempts by criminal
entrepreneurs to cut regulators short, etc.
Even in the most harmonious regulatory trade, the illegitimate nature of the market rela-
tionship, and the constant and prevailing risk of exposure and thereby the destruction of the
value of the regulatory goods, crime business and legalist regulation are uncertain market
players. This uncertainty sometimes sees recourse to regressive market behaviour. For instance,
violence, or at least its threat, is not completely excluded from the regulatory strategy.
61 While
non-violence and the legal status of legalist regulators are sufﬁcient to remove criminal
elements that challenge the status quo, the interference of non-criminal actors and competing
legitimate regulators can bring out the most extreme survival instincts in regulator and
entrepreneur which remind us that the normative approbation of crime business has real
foundation.
11. Balancing regulatory impact e regulating from the normal
Legalist regulatory contexts can impact on criminal enterprise in two broad ways. Legalist
regulatory contexts can either impede the proﬁtability of criminal business (excluded from
regulatory trade) or facilitate the proﬁtability and sustainability of criminal business (included
in regulatory trade) within a particular market context. The market context we have been
examining up until now is facilitation/restriction through legalist regulation. In the next part of
the discussion we will speculate on the manner in which such regulatory forces in turn assist in
the normalisation of critical market decision sites where crime business is operating, another
critical and universal market variable. On the way to this discussion it is useful to make clear
that normalisation as a particular regulatory ‘good’ can be traded through interaction between
criminal entrepreneurs who are included in or excluded from the beneﬁts of regulatory trade.
In Fig. 1 the regulatory interaction is between regulator and entrepreneur with opposite
market outcomes depending on the context of that interaction within regulatory trade. For an
advantageous outcome accruing to the entrepreneur the regulator must offer the service to
61Friman, 2009.
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normalise a range of critical market decision sites that relate to supply and demand conditions.
Where the regulatory relationship disadvantages an entrepreneur the market conditions are such
that the regulator acts to ‘ab-normalise’ such decision sites. For instance, with product pref-
erencing the legalist regulator can ignore law enforcement against certain consumers and
thereby beneﬁtting particular crime business with the appearance of marketing normal product,
and at the same time by selectively policing other consumer transactions, labelling those
transactions abnormal to the disadvantage of other crime businesses.
In Fig. 2 we see how legalist regulators can also provide advantageous service to a criminal
entrepreneurwithwhomtheyhavearegulatorytradebyhelpingtofacilitatenormalisedengagement
with legal entrepreneurs such as suppliers and capital providers (particularly in the form of labour
permitsandthelike).Ontheother-handthelegalistregulatorcanfurtherbeneﬁttheincludedcrime
business by restricting these ‘normalised’ engagements with legal business from crime business
competitors, and even from competitors running legal but competitive business.
Fig. 3 is the representation of critical market relationships between legalist regulators and
legal regulators, enabling a further level of normalisation and cross-over in market conditions.
So far in this paper we have used the terms cross-over and legalist regulator somewhat
interchangeably. Fig. 3 suggests a more limited and accurate conception of how a capacity to
cross-over adds value to the regulatory product. More conventional analysis of corrupt regu-
lators uses cross-over to describe the phenomenon of moving from legitimate to illegitimate
markets.
62 As our analysis is premised on the conviction that such a market distinction is
normative rather than actual, we would only conceive of cross-over in this sense, important as it
is to any law enforcement paradigms, across a porous market distinction which is signiﬁcant in
the mind and practice of the regulators themselves. The style of cross-over envisaged in Fig. 3
and, we would argue, being more potent in adding value to the regulatory ‘goods’ traded by
legalist regulators, is the drift from legal to legalist regulatory frames. This transition can occur
when the legalist regulator also invokes his legal role and authority. It also takes the form of the
legalist regulator acting either openly or in a clandestine context as the agent of the included
criminal entrepreneur, in order to inﬂuence a proﬁtable market outcome through other legal
regulatory agents or processes.
It could be said from the market context represented in Fig. 3 in particular, that forces nor-
malisingcrucialsitesformarketdecision-makingemanatefromregulatorygoodsthataregrounded
in the coercive authority of the state. Whether distorted by individual or institutional corruption
these forces retain the potential to legitimate the market variables inﬂuencing market decision-
making and to re-interpret the processes and outcomes of these decisions as authorised.
Conversely regulatory goods offered by legalist regulators can, through the same authority foun-
dations, declare market decisions as abnormal and unauthorised. There is value in both regulatory
directions, and both can directly inﬂuence the proﬁtability of conventional market conditions.
Interacting with                                                 Facilitate profitability/sustainability of criminal business
Legalist Regulators  Criminal Entrepreneurs
Impede profitability/sustainability of criminal business
Fig. 1. Direct correlation between legalist regulation and impact on criminal business.
62Sellin, 1963; Ruggiero, 2002; Morselli and Giguere, 2006; von Lampe, 2007.
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The current challenge, following the assertion that legalist regulation can (1) either facilitate
or impede the proﬁtability and sustainability of criminal enterprise, (2) advance or sabotage the
interests of criminal entrepreneurs and (3) stimulate or deter criminal entrepreneurship at an
everyday level, is to chart the interaction patterns between legalist regulators and market
players. It is crucial to interrogate the differences in the pattern of interaction between legalist
regulators and market players to understand why certain interactions sustain, while others lead
to the disintegration of criminal enterprise. We have suggested that the crucial variable in the
interaction between legalist regulators and market players that determines the sustainability or
unsustainability of criminal enterprise is the potential for regulatory goods to normalise (or
make abnormal) vital market decision making. We now will take the case of product prefer-
encing to see in summary, how this interaction might play out.
12. Product preferencing as inﬂuenced by regulation e forces for normalisation
When normalisation sets in, individuals no longer perceive a particular legally criminal act
to be so. Normalised criminal acts are:
  engaged in blatantly,
  indulged in by an entire population, and
  become integrated as a feature of the legitimate sector of society.
63
Normalisation suggests moral, cultural receptivity to certain types of criminality. Normal-
isation can occur despite the recognised illegality of a particular act. The ‘illegal’ label is
insufﬁcient to induce guilt or a sense of immorality inﬂuencing consumer choice. Normal-
isation suggests a post neutralisation state of consumer consciousness, while it is not dependant
on any normative or moral discounting assumed in neutralisation. The normative or moral
struggle which is central to sociologies of neutralisation is not a characteristic of consumer
normalisation as we see it because of:
  the frequency and recurrence of involvement in an illegitimate purpose, and thus crime
enterprise;
  the prevalence of critical and conventional motivations for consumer choice like price
comparison, priority access, consistent and comparable quality, and ease of access;
  the ambivalent response to the crime product or service by legitimate regulators;
  theunderstandingthatithasbecomethenorminthefaceofdeclininglegitimatecompetition;
  the temporal development of consumer loyalty through permanency of supply and
constancy of market conditions;
Interacting with Facilitate profitability/sustainability of criminal business
Legalist Regulators Legal Entrepreneurs
Impede profitability/sustainability of criminal business
Fig. 2. Indirect correlation between legalist regulation and impact on criminal business.
63Hanif and Findlay, 2010a.
358 M. Findlay, N. Hanif / International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice 40 (2012) 338e368Author's personal copy
  the everyday nature of the transaction e in this respect the more ‘criminal’ the consumer
relationship and the more uncommon or contrary the transaction the more likely normal-
isation will be replaced by neutralisation; and
  a ‘low harm’ factor e win win.
Through blurred marketing, the ambivalence (or even promotion) of legalist regulators, and
a mass consumer preferencing, the consumer is comforted and encouraged by the otherwise
normal market conditions of the crime product so that considerations of its illegitimate context
only represent a passing and easily negotiated concern for the consumer, if at all. Consumption
of the product becomes an economic and not a normative question. As such, deterrent law
enforcement will have little or no impact over normalised consumer behaviour. The absence of
law enforcement on the other-hand seems to have a disproportionately inferential legitimating
consequence.
Normalisation is the manifestation of structural forces that inﬂuence and diffuse into the
decision-making process of market players with market choice to exercise in speciﬁc contexts
where meaning and interpretation are ambiguous and open to external inﬂuence. To understand
the process by which the culture of normalising criminal business is brought about is to
understand deep-seated commercial culture at least, or maybe cultures of decision-making in
speciﬁc market contexts, a process of enculturation, the institutionalisation of corruption, the
minimisation of risk, and the management of competitors.
Some might argue that the need to normalise means that crime business does operate in
a distinctly illegitimate market and hence the need to create a false normative consciousness in
order to conceal from market players (or at least console their knowledge) concerning the risks
and reprehensibility of particular market choices. We argue the reverse of this conclusion by
identifying normalisation as a universal market variable. Whether one is dealing with a crime
business choice, or the decisions made by consumers to smoke tobacco and endanger their
lungs or to buy expensive branded goods that they cannot afford, normalisation is necessary to
contextualise product preference to the market advantage of either criminal or non-criminal
entrepreneurs.
Normalisation is socially organised and systematically produced by broader social forces
and structures, which subsequently shapes the world-view of market players and their decisions.
Normalisation is not a stable market variable and that is why the authorisation of legalist
regulators becomes such a conﬁrming inﬂuence over this universal market variable. Sustaining
normalisation requires constant negotiation among key players in a particular criminal trade.
Constant policing is required to ensure the preservation of this stable stage of normalisation.
64
Interacting with Facilitate profitability/sustainability of criminal business
Legalist Regulators Legal Regulators
Impede profitability/sustainability of criminal business
Fig. 3. Indirect and direct correlation between legalist and legal regulators and impact on criminal business.
64A richer analysis of these and other forces and relationships is developed in the doctoral thesis of Hanif
(forthcoming).
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13. Describing and conceptualising normalisation as a point on a spectrum of market
responses towards illicit goods and services
Through processes of normalisation the question becomes how is criminal business
perceived and lived in an everyday context? Why a product preference becomes or does not
become routine is the guiding question for analysing this market decision normalisation.
Among the factors that govern product preferencing include the following:
  Price,
  Quality,
  Accessibility,
  No informal negative label by peers,
  Absence of legal enforcement to a large extent,
  Empathy,
  Share with friends, more value for money,
  Availability of latest stuff not necessarily outdated stocks,
  Absence of heightened response by members of legitimate, competing industry,
  Good customer service,
  Absence of violence,
  Lack of understanding how criminal capital from one enterprise funds other criminal
businesses.
65
Inthecontextofcriminalenterprise,normalisationisastageinthecriminalbusinesscyclethat
a criminal entrepreneur aims to achieve, for universal market outcomes such as preferred market
share and consumer loyalty. Normalisation, or the absence of it, has the power to advance or
obstruct the rootedness, proﬁtability, and sustainability of criminal business by directly inﬂu-
encing consumer demand for and endorsement of illicit goods and services. When a criminal
business is normalised, crime enterprise operates like its legitimate counterpart. It is a stable
source of income. It offers employment. Criminal entrepreneurs can focus on expanding the
business.Criminalcapitalincreasesasaconsequenceofproﬁtthroughmassnormalisation,which
canthenbeusedtoinvestinothermorelucrative(butalsomorerisky)criminalbusinessventures.
Normalisation is a universal market variable with particular relevance for the proﬁtability
and sustainability of criminal enterprise. The inﬂuence of legalist regulators and their trade in
authorising regulatory goods, we assert, is crucial to the normalisation process. In addition, the
role of legalist regulators as normalisers mirrors the function and force of legal regulators who
enforce the regulatory conditions for the selective supply of dangerous products such as
alcohol, and the context of authority which compliance with these conditions implies.
The second and briefer section of this paper will lay out a comparative methodology for
testing the resilience of our preceding analysis. It works from these foundations:
a) Critical market variables exist across criminal and legitimate businesses in uniform market
conditions;
b) These variables have the capacity to inﬂuence one another towards the selective proﬁt-
ability and sustainability of entrepreneurs and enterprises;
65Hanif and Findlay, 2010a; see also Bloch et al. (1993).
360 M. Findlay, N. Hanif / International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice 40 (2012) 338e368Author's personal copy
c) Criminal and legal businesses can be understood in terms of market analysis in which
critical market variables indicate both the uniform and particular market motivations,
enterprise to enterprise;
d) These critical market variables, while remaining constant will adapt to and adapt speciﬁc
enterprises within uniform market contexts;
e) Market regulation has a capacity to inﬂuence proﬁtability and sustainability;
f) Regulation inﬂuences normalisation of market choices to inﬂuence proﬁtability and
sustainability;
g) In the context of criminal enterprise regulation adapts to a legalist mode and has a partic-
ular way of ensuring proﬁtability and sustainability;
h) The nature of regulatory trade, the importance or legitimacy transaction, and the value of
regulatory goods operate in a similar fashion across enterprises and within uniform market
conditions;
i) A particularly vulnerable market variable to be inﬂuenced by legalist regulation is
normalisation.
Working from these analytical conditions the next challenge is to propose a methodology
through which comparative analysis will enable empirical substantiation.
14. Examining the enterprise and market speciﬁc application of critical market
variables e testing and surviving the model in the face of enterprise
distinction e comparative contextual modelling
Having proposed two related critical market variables as useful for enabling market analysis
of crime business it becomes necessary to construct a methodology for testing the resilience of
such analysis. For this purpose we apply comparative contextual analysis.
66 Comparative
contextual analysis requires that as an essential precursor to the exploration of similarity and
difference between two social referents, there is a need to drill down deeply into each so that
their unique socio-political constituents can be understood and distilled for the comparative
project. In the comparative analysis we would propose to test the resilience of our market
variable interaction we suggest two levels of comparative exchange in which the pre-conditions
for comparison become clear.
First, it is necessary to look at the selected market variables and compare their individual and
interactive market inﬂuence within a constant market context. To some extent that has been the
purpose of what has gone before in this paper. The market context of criminal enterprise (in its
generalisable form) was nominated and applied in order to appreciate the dynamic existence of
two particular market variables. These were identiﬁed as legalist regulation and decision-
making normalisation. The drilling-down process then evolved. Legalist regulation was
understood in terms of a distortion of law enforcement regulation at large. What distinguished
legalist regulation from other regulatory modes was interrogated. Regulatory goods, regulatory
trade and legitimacy transaction were particularised as dynamics for understanding the unique
presence and capacity of legalist regulation to inﬂuence the proﬁtability of criminal enterprise
or otherwise. As for normalisation, the argument that it is a uniform market variable was made.
Then it was necessary to look at motivations for normalisation at critical decision-sites within
66This analytical format was ﬁrst developed in Findlay (1999). It is discussed and applied in detail to the comparative
analysis of different trial sentencing models in Findlay and Henham (2007).
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the market and by different market players. The manner in which normalisation would inﬂu-
ence proﬁtability and sustainability dependant on whether it occurred or was blocked gave clear
substantiation to the signiﬁcant role it played in market choice such as product preferencing.
Thecomparativeprojectbetweenthesetwovariablesandthenbetweentheirinteractionandthe
market itself was a natural by-product of deep-drilling. When normalisation was studied the
necessary question as towhat makes for normalisation, an observable phenomenon in the context
ofourstudy,
67couldnotbeavoided.Inouranalysisregulationcouldinﬂuencemostcrucialmarket
variables and due to the authority base of legalist regulation is ability to facilitate normalisation
wasstronglyevident.Thiswouldformthebridgeforcomparativecontextualanalysisatthislevel.
The comparative contextual model proposes a conceptual distinction between the notion of
evaluatorsofcontextandofevaluatorsincontextthatisdependentonthenatureofthetheoretical
(evaluative) paradigm chosen to explore the different contexts of discretionary decision-making
tied pin, say, regulatory trade and product preferencing. In short, the roleof the contextualmodel
is to ensure that market-oriented decisions are evaluated in context and across contexts in ways
which remain sensitive to the social reality of processes within and across different enterprises.
The twin components of contextual modelling can be summarised as follows:
Evaluators of context: these are theoretical propositions selected on the basis that they are
likely to provide some conceptual insights that will contribute to our understanding of the
particular social phenomena chosen for analysis. The focus is more on process (the
construction of process in comparative context).
Evaluation in context: this refers to the practice of comparative contextual analysis, using
these interpretive methodologies which have been dictated by the theoretical positions
chosen on the basis of the problem chosen.
Evaluators of context consist of ‘acceptable knowledge’ which is tested against ‘reality’ and
becomes modiﬁed by ‘emerging knowledge’ produced through the recursive process of eval-
uation in context. The latter allows us to gradually modify (and or conﬁrm) accepted knowledge
through veriﬁcation, while the process of theory generation may suggest conﬁrmation, inte-
gration and postulate new evaluators. If we go to our more basic analytical problem once we
have theorised the universal utility of market analysis for the understanding of criminal
enterprise set free of normative distinction. The problem must move to be that market analysis
employing critical market variables will hold even with adaptation within and across distinctly
different criminal enterprises. Therein lies the empirical challenge.
In this setting evaluators of context become the manner in which we employ the critical
market variables, their interaction and their adaptation. Evaluation in context is to search out
the uniform market inﬂuences such as proﬁtability and sustainability of even these variables in
their adapted form, when features of context such as the presence of violence and disorder as
components of regulatory trade or as pressures on normalisation, prevail.
15. Conclusion e putting crime back into crime business e market ambiguity and
normative distraction
As a post script we committed at the outset of this paper to address the criticism that a neutral-
isation of the normative distinction between illegitimate and legitimate markets left the way open
67Hanif and Findlay, 2010a.
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forirresponsiblytakingcrimeoutofcrimebusiness.Thisrecognition,whichassurestheaudienceof
the authors’ moral commitment against organised crime, in fact does not alter the reality that the
blurred morality of consumers, evidenced from their preferencing and normalisation when
consuming criminal commodities, systematically encourages the establishment and promotes the
proﬁtability,sustainabilityandgrowthoforganisedcrimebusinessbothlocallyandtrans-nationally.
However, at the riskofseeming touse enterprisetheorytodiscountcriminalityas a signiﬁcantand
distinguishing feature of business and market vulnerability, the following ‘saving’ considerations
are proposed as an essential backdrop for the study of crime business and illegitimate markets.
Organisedcrimeresearchandthinkingisinﬂictedwithcompetingideologicalstandpointsthat
have compromised any context-independent conceptualisation, theorisation and regulation of
crime business. Our commitment to challenge normative distinctions between a legitimate and
illegitimate market, business, entrepreneurs and networks is contextualised ﬁrst against the need
toreﬂectourempiricalﬁndingsandsecondasanefforttorectifywherepossiblethediversiﬁedand
competing understandings of the complex phenomenon of organised crime. It is problematic
enoughtoassertthatcorruptioncanbegoodbusiness,
68yettodosodoesnotrequireaco-existent
denial that corrupt regulatory services are anything but destructive of competition and market
freedom. Therefore, legalist regulation and the conditions for product normalisation it can
promote, we argue, may possess facilitative potential for enterprise, but represent a negative
potential when seen in their expressive role. Legalist regulation in an expressive context is not
legal. Where it is brought about through the regulatory conditions of corrupt law enforcement or
licensing, product normalisation does not make consumer practice legal or legitimate in an
expressive sense. Nevertheless the extent to which a legal framework that legalises and crimi-
nalises particular actions is internalised by those, whose behaviour it seeks to govern, remains an
intensely neglected dimension of organised crime understanding. An act criminalised by the law
does not necessarily retain its negative connotations among those for whom the act is illegal.
Understanding the dynamics which overturn the negativity imposed by a criminalising process
holds great potential for developing a regulatory framework or remedies that work. The ‘incon-
sistent success of supply-side remedies’
69 to reduce various crime businesses, increasingly is
perceived as indicative that ‘demand for illicit goods and services structure the rationality of the
economicactivitiesinwhichorganisedcrimeengagesitself’.
70Suchaconclusionfailstocreatean
impetus for research paradigms constructed through the lens of demand and aimed at under-
standing the motivations and organisation of crime business, particularly determining how to
target consumers of criminal commodities and which appeal to use.
Another way of approaching criminality as a discriminator of both enterprise and markets,
within which business operates, is to return to the Weberian distinction of mechanical and
organic organisational environments. Proﬁtability in a free market model is organic insofar as it
may be a product of competitive market conditions. Regulation (legalist or otherwise) and
consumer normalisation (manipulated or preferential) are mechanical inﬂuences over markets
and enterprise positioning. Viewed in terms of legality and legitimacy enterprises may be
similar in their organic nature (proﬁtability) and yet different in their mechanical existence
(criminality being a signiﬁcant mechanical determinant). Research which attempts to adapt the
analogy of entrepreneurship or its corollary concept of entrepreneurial orientation, both
deﬁned, differentiated and modelled within legal market contexts, to conceptualise and advance
68For a discussion of this in a developing market context see Findlay (2007).
69Bloch et al., 1993.
70Gordon, 1980.
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a ‘general theory’ of rationales motivating organised crime are systematically critiqued within
“social models”
71 as ontologically and phenomenologically unconvincing.
These observations, however, remain as normative critiques which adamantly refuse to admit
the entrepreneurial orientation of criminal business and entrepreneurs. Comparative contextual
analyses drawn between licit and illicit market representations, businesses and entrepreneurial
orientation are critiqued by cultural theorists as phenomenologically unconvincing since these
parallelsareassumedbysuperimposingamaterialistontologyonthe‘supplyofillicitandservices
in demand’ as a common denominator of all deﬁnitions of organised crime.
72 Competing cultural
theorisations of organised crime echo the Weberian
73 caution to recall that illicit entrepreneurial
orientation, referring to the ‘processes, practices and decision-making activities’.
74
Polemic against the comparative analyses of organised crime as “the extension of legitimate
market activities into areas normally proscribed for the pursuit of proﬁt and in response to
a latent illicit demand”
75 centres on the implicit, phenomenologically-contentious assumption
that materialism is the ontological base of legitimate and illegitimate market order, structure,
culture and dynamics.
76 Although illegal entrepreneurs embody in the fullest form the “animal
spirits” of capitalism, the constraints created by the illegality of the products these actors
provide have been so far so powerful as to prevent the development of modern capitalist
companies similar to those that populate the legal sphere. Such critiques however remain the
product of resistance to recognising the entrepreneurial orientation characterising organised
criminality and the entrepreneurialism of crime business.
The criminal and legitimate economies are not distinguishable in any market variable sense.
An essential reason for the teleological failure of enterprise theory is it’s incapacity to
dispassionately recognise and engage with crime as ‘good’ business in a proﬁt/market sense,
and the commercially conducive conditions of criminality (particularly corruption) as they
advance proﬁt. In many transitional societies, in fact, crime and corruption are not only good
business they may be the only viable business.
77 Enterprise theory has little to say about more
viable trading arrangements, where black markets are the market of choice for the consumer.
This is because the more generalised and a historical musings within enterprise theory about the
progression of market relations and commercial arrangements tend to take as a given that
consumer preference for crime business is dependent on crime factors (addiction, perversions,
violence, intimidation) rather than more predictable consumer inﬂuences such as price and
quality.
71Williams and Godson, 2002, p. 328.
72Paoli, 2002.
73Weber, 2001.
74Lumpkin and Dess, 1996, p. 136.
75Smith, 1975 The Maﬁa Mystique (New York: Basic Books, 1990), p. 335.
76According to Raimondo Catanzaro, for instance, “the only commonly agreed upon identifying characteristic is that
the Maﬁa exists to make proﬁts illegally” ([1988] 1992, p. 3 and 1991, p. 3), and the element that maﬁa and organised
crime share and that distinguishes them from social bandits is “their organisational stability, their being shaped in the
form of a ‘ﬁrm’ within the ﬁeld of normal economic activities” ([1988] 1991, p. 4). Participants in criminal organi-
sations are considered to be persons associated for the purpose of engaging in criminal activity on a more or less
sustained basis. They usually engage in enterprise crime, namely the provision of illicit goods and services, or of licit
goods that have been acquired through illicit means, such as theft or fraud. (.) The activities of organised crime groups
require a signiﬁcant degree of cooperation and organisation to provide illicit goods and services. Like any business, the
business of crime requires entrepreneurial skill, considerable specialisation, and a capacity of coordination, and this in
addition to using violence and corruption to facilitate the conduct of activities (UNESCO, 1994, p. 4).
77Findlay, 2007.
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The challenge for existing enterprise theory is to break free of the normative and moralist
dichotomies (false as they are) between good and bad business, or legitimate and illegitimate
commerce. Once outside the construction of organised crime as disorderly and thereby anti-
thetical to a better business model, enterprise theory can reveal the motivations behind corrupt
regulatory relationships and anti-competitive marketing, which characterise crime business
much more than violence and intimidation. In this, enterprise theory does not provide an
apologia for criminal corruption of legitimate markets. Rather it enables a consideration of the
corruptibility of regulators and the susceptibility of inelastic market models to criminal
competition.
Even violence, a normative constant believed to characterise illegal markets, stems more
from limited observational engagement with criminal players occupying the lower rungs within
the criminal networks of an organisation, than being a necessarily reﬂection of the features that
characterise what is commonly called the ‘black’ market. Legalist regulation manages the
degree of violence necessary to maintain stable conditions in the operation of criminal business
within an overlapping contextual representation of licit and illicit markets. With legalist
regulation, violence is redundant. Legalist regulation accomplishes and offers the stability
violence could never guarantee and without disrupting the process of marketing,
manufacturing, importing, exporting and consumption of criminal commodities. This is
contrary to the traditional image that is conjured up when people envision organised criminal
groups as violent street thugs. They use violence to protect and expand their turf, thereby
protecting and expanding their proﬁts. Violence and the economic and socio-political
sustainability of criminal enterprise within any market context are mutually exclusive.
Violence risks the economic viability, the degree to which criminal business can be normalised
alongside legitimate enterprise and the relative capacity for criminal entrepreneurs to elicit the
collaboration of legalist regulators to facilitate the operations of illegitimate enterprise by
emphasising and magnifying the criminality of crime business.
To advance a hypothesis that criminal enterprise is best understood through universal market
analysis presents the analytical paradox that if markets are universal then how can we nominate
normalisation, and regulatory cross-over (which seems to react to and depend on market
distinction) as constant and uniform critical market variables. The answer lies in appreciating
the following market realities and from here drawing, where appropriate, the relevant normative
conclusions. In so doing we move from the realm of analytical critique to policy formulation.
An interrogation of organised crime through market analysis that speciﬁcally expresses no
a priori, ideological commitment, typically inﬂuenced by law enforcement parlance and other
normative determinants regarding the features of ‘black’ versus ‘free’ market economy or
‘crime’ versus ‘business’, holds great potential for conceptual and theoretical abstraction as
well as governance strategies and regulatory policies. At the same time we can argue that
market reality (and thereby the capacity to market model) is not bound by normative distinc-
tions, while at the same time critical market variables can be born out of false normative
distinctions. Crime or business, black or free market are contextual extremes that: (1) fail to
capture the common characteristics between them, (2) do not encourage reﬂexivity between
these extreme categories and (3) compromise the capacity to foster any converging con-
ceptualisation and theorisation of organised crime to facilitate drafting a regulatory framework
that targets the motivations at the heart of crime business.
Competing theoretical frameworks breed competing regulatory frameworks with limited
potential for success, since the core motivation remains fallacious, misunderstood, ideologi-
cally misrepresented or simply ignored. Understandably competing theoretical frameworks to
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explain organised crime are rooted in context speciﬁc investigations that link knowledge
production to speciﬁc supply-side empirical referents, whether illicit organisation, network,
trade or market. We suggest that by shifting attention from individual organisations, business,
or network to a market analysis that interpretations of organised criminality as an attempt to
stimulate, intensify and sustain consumer demand for criminal commodities are more
productive for understanding and controlling organised crime. Market analysis values supply
and demand perspectives. It is only by taking into account both sides of market transactions
(illicit gains) that a uniﬁed regulatory framework for addressing the role of all parties in crime
business, subsequently prompting a remedy that targets the various roles that are fundamental
in accounting for the persistency of such crime business can be drafted. The false normative
distinction between market legitimacy is easier to endorse by using a supply focus on
marketing rather than a demand focus. In the later, normalisation is more apparent and this
argues for market universality. Normalisation, after all is only a normative activity which then
turns it into a market variable. Market analysis forces criminologists to address the popularity
of criminal commodities among consumers contextualised against legal enforcement strate-
gies, heavier sentences, public education campaigns, as well as informal or peer regulation to
deter consumers. In this study we have emphasised one of those conditions, legalist regulation
and the way it facilitates and manages legal and illegal trade within a common market frame.
In particular we have noted how legalist regulation embraces or distorts or abandons law
enforcement, producing optimum conditions in which criminal businesses operate and the
normalisation of criminal behaviour or criminal consumption proliferates. Cross over regu-
lators collude with crime entrepreneurs to exploit universal market conditions, while at the
same time using the regulation of a false market distinction to gain market preferencing
through reducing competition and opening up opportunity. It is their continual cross over that
not only indicated that their distinguished border between legitimate and illegitimate markets
is porous, but in fact it does not exist beyond the normative frame, which is compromised by
legalism.
Market modelling of cross-over features which sheds light on normalisation demonstrates
the potential of market analysis for understanding entrenched crime business across socio-
economic polities and historical contexts. The normative process of distinguishing through
regulation creates the normative conditions in which normalisation and cross-over become
market variables. Thereby, market analysis is universal, where markets can be speciﬁc in which
legitimate and illegitimate enterprises and businesses can compete and ﬂourish. But it is crucial
that distinct market features are rooted in a demand dimension as much as a supply dimension.
Market analysis explains the subtle and not-so-subtle differences between organised criminals
of different cultural and historical contexts.
The importance of market analysis is that it truly offers a way of understanding crime
business as a social system, the factors which explain its emergence, persistency, proﬁtability,
sustainability and growth. Market analysis, applied to an interrogation of the social networks
underlying organised criminality, produces an interpretive approach that transcends crimino-
logical paradigms of organised criminality as a pathological, an ethnic, economic or a class
motivated response by emphasising demand as a common supposition from each paradigm. In
so doing, market analysis facilitates a holistic appreciation of the organised crime phenomenon,
coming closer thereby to grounding realistic evidence-based policy for effectively regulating
local and transnational crime business. With that result in mind market analysis is not taking
crime out of crime business but rather it offers regulators a better chance of taking out crime
business.
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